Random Selection with an Adversarial Majority*

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Abstract

We consider the problem of random selection, where p players follow a protocol to jointly select a random element of a universe of size n. However, some of the players may be adversarial and collude to force the output to lie in a small subset of the universe. We describe essentially the first protocols that solve this problem in the presence of a dishonest majority in the full-information model (where the adversary is computationally unbounded and all communication is via non-simultaneous broadcast). Our protocols are nearly optimal in several parameters, including the round complexity (as a function of n), the randomness complexity, the communication complexity, and the tradeoffs between the fraction of honest players, the probability that the output lies in a small subset of the universe, and the density of this subset.

Keywords: cryptography, distributed computing, leader election, collective coin-flipping, information-theoretic security, samplers, randomness extractors.

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1 Introduction

Suppose p players wish to jointly make a random choice from a universe of size n. They follow some protocol, and if all parties play honestly, the output is indeed a uniformly random one. However, some of the players may form a coalition and deviate arbitrarily from the protocol, in an attempt to force some output. The problem of random selection is that of designing a protocol in which the influence of coalitions of dishonest players is somehow limited.

Random selection is a very useful building block for distributed algorithms and cryptographic protocols, because it allows one to first design protocols assuming a public source of randomness, which is often an easier task, and then replace public randomness with the output of a random selection protocol. Of course, for this to work, there must be a good match between the guarantees of the random selection protocol and the requirements of the application at hand. Nevertheless, this general paradigm has been applied successfully numerous times in the past in various settings, e.g., [Yao86, GMW87, GGL98, OVY93, Dam93, DGW94, Oka00, GSV98, Lin01, Bar02, KO04]. This motivates a systematic study of random selection in its own right, like the one we undertake in this paper.

The Setting. The problem of random selection has been widely studied in a variety of settings, which differ in the following respects:

Adversary's Computational Power. In some work on random selection, such as Blum's 'coin-tossing over the telephone' [Blu82], the adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded (e.g., probabilistic polynomial time). Generally, in this setting one utilizes one-way functions and other cryptographic primitives to limit the adversary's ability to cheat, and thus the resulting protocols rely on complexity assumptions. In this paper, we study the *information-theoretic* setting, where the adversary is computationally unbounded (so complexity assumptions are useless).

Communication Model and the Adversary's Information. There is a choice between having point-to-point communication channels, a broadcast channel, or both. In the case of point-to-point communication, one can either assume private channels, as in [BGW88, CCD88], or allow the adversary full access to all communication, as in the *full-information model* of Ben-Or and Linial [BL89]. We allow a broadcast channel and work in the full-information model (so there is no benefit from point-to-point channels). We do not assume simultaneous communication, and thus consider a 'rushing' adversary, which can send its messages in a given round after receiving those of the honest players.

Number of Players. There has been work specifically studying two-party protocols where one of the players is adversarial; examples in the full-information model include [GGL98, SV05]. Other works study p-player protocols for large p, such as the large body of work on collective coin-flipping (random selection where the universe is of size $n = 2$) and leader election [BL89, Sak89, AN93, CL95, ORV94, BN00, Zuc97, RZ98, Fei99]. In this paper, we focus on the latter setting of *p-player protocols*, but some of our results are significant even for $p = 2$.

To summarize, here we study general multiparty protocols for random selection in the full-information model (with a broadcast channel). This is the first work in this setting to focus on the

case that a majority of the players may be dishonest.[1] It may be surprising that protocols exist for this case, as the other two other well-studied problems in this setting, leader election and collective coin-flipping, are provably impossible to solve with an adversarial majority [Sak89].

> **The Goal:** Construct p-player protocols for selecting an element of $[n]$ such that even if a β fraction of players are cheating, the probability that the output lands in any small subset of $[n]$, of density μ, is at most ε.

Particular applications of random selection protocols often have special additional requirements, such as "simulatability." However, all of the existing work on random selection with information-theoretic security, such as [BL89, Sak89, GGL98, NOVY98, AN93, Dam93, DGW94, GSV98, RZ98, Fei99, DHRS04, SV05], seem to include at least some variant of our requirement above. Thus it is of interest to understand this requirement on its own, in particular the tradeoffs between the parameters p, n, β, μ, and ε, as well as the efficiency of protocols meeting the requirement.

As these five parameters vary, we have a very general class of problems, which includes many previously studied problems as special cases (See Section 2.2.). Some natural settings of parameters are n being exponentially large in the security parameter (e.g., choosing a random k-bit string), p being constant or polynomial, β being a constant in $(0, 1)$ (we are particularly interested in $\beta \geq 1/2$), and μ, ε either being constants in $(0, 1)$ or tending to zero.

Regarding protocol efficiency, we focus primarily on information-theoretic measures, such as the communication and round complexities, but we also provide some computationally efficient versions of our protocols.

Our Results. In this paper, we give several protocols for random selection that tolerate an arbitrarily large fraction of cheating players $\beta < 1$. The protocols are nearly optimal in many of the parameters, for example:

- One of our protocols achieves an error probability of $\varepsilon = \tilde{O}(\mu^{1-\beta})$, when the number of players is constant and the density μ of bad outcomes is arbitrary. This comes close to the lower bound of $\varepsilon \geq \mu^{1-\beta}$ proven by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [GGL98]. For a nonconstant number of players, we can come polynomially close to the lower bound, achieving $\varepsilon = \mu^{\Omega(1-\beta)}$, provided that the fraction β of cheating players is bounded away from 1.

- One of our protocols can handle any density μ of bad outcomes that is smaller than the fraction $\alpha = 1 - \beta$ of honest players while achieving an error probability ε that is bounded away from 1. More generally, we can handle any constants α, μ such that $\lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor \leq \lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$, which is a tight tradeoff by a lower bound of Feige [Fei99].

- In our protocols, the total number of coins tossed by the honest parties is $\log n + o(\log n)$ (when the other parameters are constant), which almost equals the lower bound of $\log n - O(1)$. As the only bits communicated in our protocols are the random coin tosses, the communication complexity is also nearly optimal.

- As a function of n, the round complexity of our protocols is $\log^* n + O(1)$ (when the other parameters are constant). This is within a factor of essentially 2 of the $(1/2 - o(1)) \log^* n$

[1] We note that dishonest majorities have been studied extensively in the settings of computationally bounded parties and private channels, both for Byzantine agreement and secure computation, e.g., [GMW87, LPS80, GL02].

lower bound proven by Sanghvi and Vadhan [SV05], which applies whenever $\beta \geq 1/2$, and $\mu > 0$ and $\varepsilon < 1$ are constants.

Techniques. Our protocols build upon recent work on round-efficient leader election [RZ98, Fei99] and round-efficient two-party random selection [SV05]. Specifically, the leader election protocols of Russell and Zuckerman [RZ98] and Feige [Fei99] work by iterating a one-round protocol that reduces the task of electing a leader from p players to that of electing from polylog(p) players. Similarly, the two-party random selection protocol of Sanghvi and Vadhan [SV05] utilizes a one-round protocol that reduces selecting from a universe of size n to selecting from one of size polylog(n). We combine these approaches, iteratively reducing both the number of players and the universe size in parallel. To do this, we construct new one-round universe reduction protocols that work for many parties (instead of just two, as in [SV05]). We obtain these by establishing a connection between randomness extractors [NZ96] (or, equivalently, randomness-efficient samplers) and universe reduction protocols. Optimizing parameters of the underlying extractors then translates to optimizing parameters of the universe reduction protocols, resulting in the near-optimal bounds we achieve in our final protocols. Our main results, as outlined above, refer to protocols that use optimal extractors, as proven to exist via the probabilistic method, and thus are not explicit or computationally efficient. In Section 6, we also give computationally efficient versions of our protocols, using some of the best known explicit constructions of extractors. Any additional deficiencies in these protocols are due to limitations in the state-of-the-art in constructing extractors, which we view as orthogonal to the issues we study here. Indeed, if the loss turns out to be too much for some application, then that would provide motivation for further research on explicit constructions of extractors.

Organization. Section 2 includes definitions, a more detailed description of previous work and how it relates to this paper, and our results. Section 3 contains the one-round selection protocols that are the final ingredient in our protocols, and in Section 4 we give protocols that reduce the number of players and the size of the universe. In Section 5 we describe how the different pieces fit together to form our final protocols. Finally, our results on explicit protocols, as well as new and known lower bounds and their relation to our results, appear in Sections 6 and 7 respectively.

2 Formal Definitions, Previous Work and Results

2.1 Random Selection Protocols

We now define random selection protocols.

Definition 2.1 (random selection protocol) *A* (p, n)-selection protocol *is specified by* p *functions (players)* $A_1, \ldots, A_p$*, a function* f*, and a number* t *such that:*

- *At round* i*, the* j*'th player outputs (i.e. broadcasts) a message* $m_i^{(j)}$*, obtained by applying the function* A_j *to all previous messages sent, namely* $\{m_l^{(k)} : k \in [p], l < i\}$*, as well as the player's random coins,* $r^{(j)}$*.*
- *After* t *rounds, the players output* $f(\{m_l^{(k)} : k \in [p], l \in \{1, \ldots, t\}\})$*, which is an element of* $[n]$*.*

In the above description, the protocol cannot require the (honest) players to base their messages in round i on the messages of other players in round i. However, since we do not want to assume simultaneity within a round, we allow dishonest players to base their messages on the outputs of all the other players from the same round (but not from later rounds). That is, we do not have any private communication channels and we consider a "rushing" adversary. This results in the full-information model of [BL89]:

Definition 2.2 (full-information adversary model) *When we say a set $S \subseteq [p]$ of players in a (p,n)-selection protocol is* cheating*, we mean that these players compute their messages $m_i^{(j)}$ using arbitrary functions $(A_j^*)_{j \in S}$ (rather than the A_j's) and these functions A_j^* are applied not only to messages in previous rounds, but also the messages of the honest players in the current round i (i.e., $\{m_i^{(k)} : k \in [p] \setminus S\}$) as well as some shared coin tosses r_S among the dishonest players.*

Given this definition, our notion of security is the following.

Definition 2.3 *A (p,n)-*selection protocol *is called $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-*resilient *if when at most a β fraction of players are cheating and S is any subset of $[n]$ of density at most μ, the probability that the output lands in S is at most ε. We refer to S as a* bad set*.*

We will be interested in the asymptotic behavior of protocols, so when we discuss (p,n)-selection protocols that are $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient, we are implicitly referring to a family of protocols, one for each value of p, n, β, μ, and ε (or some specified infinite set of tuples $(p, n, \beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$). We are then interested in optimizing a variety of complexity measures:

Definition 2.4 (complexity measures) *The* computation time *of a (p,n)-selection protocol is the maximum total time spent by all (honest) players (to compute their messages using the functions A_j, as well as the function f) in an execution of the protocol. We call a protocol* explicit *if its computation time is* $\mathrm{poly}(\log n, p)$*.*

The round complexity *is the total number of rounds of the protocol. The* randomness complexity *of a protocol is the maximum total number of random bits used by the players.*[2] *(Typically this maximum is achieved when all players are honest.) The* communication complexity *of a protocol is the maximum total number of bits communicated by the players.*[3]

All our protocols are public-coin, in the sense that the honest players flip their random coins and broadcast the results. Thus, the communication complexity is equal to the randomness complexity. By convention, we assume that if a player sends a message that deviates from the protocol in some syntactically obvious way (e.g., the player outputs more bits than requested), then its message is replaced with some canonical string of the correct form (e.g., the all-zeroes string).

2.2 Previous Work

We now discuss the relationship of the above definitions, specifically of $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient (p,n)-selection protocols, to existing notions and results in the literature.

[2] Actually, it will be convenient to allow the players to pick elements uniformly at random from $\{1, \ldots, m\}$ where m is determined during the protocol and may not be a power of 2, and in such a case we view this as costing $\log_2 m$ random bits.

[3] As with randomness complexity, it will be convenient to allow players to send elements of $\{1, \ldots, m\}$, in which case we charge $\log_2 m$ bits of communication.

Two-Party Random Selection. This is the special case where $p = 2$ and $\beta = 1/2$, and attention in previous work has focused on the tradeoff between μ and ε as well as the round complexity. Specifically,

- Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [GGL98] constructed, for every $n = 2^i$, an explicit $(2, n)$-selection protocol that is $(1/2, \mu, O(\sqrt{\mu}))$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$. The protocol takes $2 \log n$ rounds. They also prove that the bound of $\varepsilon = O(\sqrt{\mu})$ is tight (as a special case of a more general result mentioned later).

- Sanghvi and Vadhan [SV05] constructed, for every constant $\delta > 0$ and every n, an explicit $(2, n)$-selection protocol that is $(1/2, \mu, O(\sqrt{\mu + \delta}))$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$. Their protocol takes $\log^* n + O(1)$ rounds. They also prove that $(\log^* n - \log^* \log^* n - O(1))/2$ rounds are necessary for any $(2, n)$-selection protocol that is $(1/2, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for constants $\mu > 0$ and $\varepsilon < 1$.

Collective Coin-Flipping [BL89]. This is the special case when $n = 2$ and $\mu = 1/2$. Attention in the literature has focused on constructing efficient protocols that are $(\beta, 1/2, \varepsilon)$-resilient where β and ε are constants (independent of p), β is as large as possible, and $\varepsilon < 1$. Such a protocol exists for every constant $\beta < 1/2$ [BN00] and can be made explicit [Zuc97]. Conversely, it is impossible to achieve $\beta = 1/2$ and $\varepsilon < 1$ [Sak89]. Efficient constructions of such protocols have been based on leader election (described below).

Leader Election.

Definition 2.5 *A* p-player leader election protocol *is a* (p, p)*-selection protocol. It is* (β, ε)-resilient *if when at most a* β *fraction of players are cheating, the probability that the output is the index of a cheating player is at most* ε*.*

- Every $(\beta, \beta, \varepsilon)$-resilient (p, p)-selection protocol is a (β, ε)-resilient p-player leader election protocol. The converse does not hold because the the former considers *each* subset $S \subset [p]$ of density at most β as a potential bad set of outcomes, but the latter only considers the subset consisting of the cheating players.

- Nevertheless, a p-player leader election protocol can be used to construct a (p, n)-selection protocol for any n by having the elected leader choose a uniform, random element of $[n]$ as the output. If the election protocol is (β, ε)-resilient, then the resulting selection protocol will be $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon + (1 - \varepsilon) \cdot \mu)$-resilient for every $\mu \geq 0$.

- By the impossibility result for collective coin-flipping mentioned above [Sak89] and the previous bullet, it is impossible to have an election protocol that is (β, ε)-resilient for $\beta = 1/2$ and $\varepsilon < 1$.

- A long line of work [AN93, CL95, ORV94, Zuc97, RZ98, Fei99] on optimizing the resilience and round complexity for leader election has culminated in the following result of Russell and Zuckerman [RZ98].[4] For every constant $\beta < 1/2$, there exists an $\varepsilon < 1$ such that for

[4] A very recent paper [1] aims to optimize ε as a function of β, obtaining efficient leader election protocols with $\varepsilon = O(\beta)$.

all p, there is an explicit (β, ε)-resilient p-player leader election protocol of round complexity $\log^* p + O(1)$. Consequently, for all constants $\beta < 1/2$ and $\mu > 0$, there is a constant $\varepsilon < 1$ such that for all p and n, there is an explicit $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient (p, n)-selection protocol.

Multi-Party Random Selection. This is the general problem that encompasses the previous special cases.

- Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Linial [GGL98] constructed, for every $n = 2^i$ and every p, an explicit (p, n)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \mu, \mu^{1-O(\beta)})$-resilient for all sufficiently small β and every $\mu > 0$. The protocol runs in polylog(n) rounds. They also showed that any $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient protocol must satisfy $\varepsilon \geq \mu^{1-\beta}$.
- Russell and Zuckerman [RZ98] constructed, for every n and p such that $n \geq p^c$ for a constant c, an explicit one-round (p, n)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \mu, \mu \cdot n/n^{\Omega(1-\beta)})$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$ and $1 > \beta > 0$.

Notice that all but the last of the above results require that the fraction β of bad players satisfies $\beta \leq 1/2$.[5] For collective coin-flipping and leader election, this is supported by impossibility results showing that $\beta \geq 1/2$ is impossible. For 2-party random selection, it does not make sense to discuss $\beta > 1/2$. The only result which applies to $\beta \geq 1/2$ is the last one (of [RZ98]). However, the resilience $\mu \cdot n/n^{\Omega(1-\beta)}$ is quite weak and only interesting when the density μ of the bad set is close to $1/n$.[6] Our work is the first to show strong results for the case $\beta > 1/2$.

2.3 Our Results

In this section, we present our main results. All of our protocols utilize certain kinds of randomness-efficient samplers (equivalently, randomness extractors). Here we present the versions of our results obtained by using optimal samplers, proven to exist via the probabilistic method. We also have explicit (i.e., computationally efficient) versions of our protocols, obtained by using best known explicit constructions of samplers; these are described in Section 6.

The first main result of this paper is the following:

Theorem 2.6 *For all constants $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $k > 0$ and $\delta > 0$, there exists a constant $\varepsilon < 1$ and a (p, n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\max(\log^* p, \log^* n) + O(1)$ *rounds.*

(ii) The protocol is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\alpha = 1/(k+1) + \delta$ and $\mu = 1/k - \delta$.

(iii) The randomness complexity of the protocol is $(\log n)/\alpha + o(\log n) + O(p \log p)$.

The tradeoff between α and μ in the above theorem is optimal up to the slackness parameter δ. This is shown in Corollary 7.5, as a consequence of a lower bound of Feige [Fei99]. Furthermore, the round and randomness complexity are nearly optimal as functions of n, as shown by Corollary 7.2 and Theorem 7.6.

Setting $p = 2$ and $\alpha = 1/2$, we obtain the following two-party protocol:

[5] The hidden constant in the protocol of [GGL98] is larger than 2.

[6] The significance of the [RZ98] protocol is that it is one round and only requires n polynomial in p; in fact, there is a trivial protocol with somewhat better parameters when n is exponential in p (Lemma 3.1).

Corollary 2.7 *For every constant $\delta > 0$, there exists a constant $\varepsilon < 1$ and a $(2, n)$-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\log^* n + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1/2, 1/2 - \delta, \varepsilon)$-resilient.

(iii) The randomness complexity of the protocol is $2 \log n + o(\log n)$.

This protocol improves upon the two-party protocol of [SV05][7] in two ways: first, the randomness complexity is a nearly optimal $2 \log n + o(\log n)$, and not polylog(n). Second, their protocol is $(1/2, \nu, \varepsilon')$-resilient for some small constant ν, and not for the nearly optimal $\frac{1}{2} - \delta$. In other words, their resilience is not optimal in the density of the bad set. On the other hand, the error probability ε' of their protocol is smaller than that of ours. However, a special case of our second theorem below gives the parameters of [SV05] with the added benefit of optimal randomness complexity.

Our next two results optimize the error probability ε as a function of the density μ of the bad set and fraction β of cheating players. The first achieves a near-optimal tradeoff when the number of players is small (e.g., constant).

Theorem 2.8 *For all $\mu, \alpha > 0$ and $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a (p, n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\log^* n - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for

$$\varepsilon = \mu^\alpha \cdot O\left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu} + (1 - \alpha)p\right)^{1-\alpha} \cdot 2^{(1-\alpha)p}.$$

(iii) The randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(p + \log(1/\mu))]/\alpha + \log(1/(1-\alpha)) + O(p \log p)$

Note that when the number p of players and the fraction α of honest players are constants, the bound becomes $\varepsilon = \tilde{O}(\mu^\alpha)$, which nearly matches the lower bound of $\varepsilon \geq \mu^\alpha$ proven in [GGL98] (see Theorem 7.3). However, the bound on ε grows exponentially with p. This is removed in the following theorem, albeit at the price of achieving a slightly worse error probability of $\mu^{\Omega(\alpha)}$ (for constrained values of α).

Theorem 2.9 *There is a universal constant c such that for all $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mu, \alpha > 0$ satisfying $\alpha \geq \sqrt{c \log\log(1/\mu)/\log(1/\mu)}$, there exists a (p, n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\max\{\log^* p, \log^* n\} - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \mu^{\Omega(\alpha)})$-resilient.

(iii) The randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(p)]/\alpha + O(p \log p) + \text{poly}(1/\alpha, \log(1/\mu))$.

[7] Note that in [SV05], the claimed round complexity is $2 \log^* n + O(1)$, but this difference from our claim is only a difference of convention: in their model, only one player may communicate in each round, whereas we use the convention of multi-party protocols, in which all players may communicate simultaneously in one round.

One disadvantage of the above two theorems (as compared to, say, the honest-majority protocols of [GGL98]) is that the protocols require an a priori upper-bound μ on the density of the bad set. However, we also benefit from this, in that the round complexity improves as μ tends to zero. In particular, if $\mu \leq 1/\log^{(k)} n$ for some constant k, where $\log^{(k)}$ denotes k iterated logarithms, then the round complexity is *constant*.

It is natural to wonder whether one might get simultaneously achieve the best of both Theorem 2.6, where $\alpha \approx \mu$, and Theorem 2.8 or 2.9, where $\varepsilon \to 0$ as $\mu \to 0$. However, the $\varepsilon \geq \mu^\alpha$ lower bound of [GGL98] shows that this is impossible (because $\mu^\mu \to 1$ as $\mu \to 0$).

3 One-Round Protocols

We start with some simple one-round protocols that will play a role in our later constructions.

Lemma 3.1 *For every $p, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$ and $n = \ell^p$, there is an explicit (p, n)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \mu, n^\beta \cdot \mu)$-resilient for every $\beta, \mu > 0$.*

Proof Sketch: Each player outputs a random element of $[\ell]$, and we take the concatenation of the players' outputs. □

The above protocol has two main disadvantages. First, the size of the universe $n = \ell^p$ must be at least exponential in the number of players. (We note that Russell and Zuckerman [RZ98] showed how to reduce this requirement to be only polynomial, at the price of a somewhat worse resilience. We will avoid this difficulty in a different manner, by first reducing the number of players.) Second, in terms of resilience, a bad set of density μ gets multiplied by a factor that grows polynomially with the universe size (namely, n^β). However, when the number of players is small (e.g., a fixed constant) and the universe is small (e.g., $n = O(1/\mu)$), it can achieve a nearly optimal bound on ε as a function of β and μ (cf., Theorem 7.3).

Lemma 3.2 ([Fei99], Cor. 5) *For every $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\alpha, \mu \in [0, 1]$ such that $\lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor \leq \lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$, there exists an $\varepsilon < 1$ and a (p, n)-selection protocol that is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient. Specifically, one can take $\varepsilon = 1 - \exp(-\Omega(\alpha \cdot (1 - \mu) \cdot np))$.*

Proof Sketch: Every player chooses a random subset of $[n]$ of density at least $1 - \mu$, and the output is the first element of $[n]$ that is contained in every set S that was picked by at least an α fraction of players. Such an element exists because there exist at most $\lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor \leq \lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$ such sets S, but any $\lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$ sets of density at least $1 - \mu$ must have a common intersection. □

The advantage of the above protocol is that it achieves an optimal tradeoff between α and μ (cf., Theorem 7.5). The main disadvantage is that ε can depend on p and n (this time with exponentially bad dependence), and that it is not sufficiently explicit — even the communication is of length $\Theta(n)$ (rather than polylog(n)).

4 Universe and Player Reduction

The simple 1-round protocols of the previous section behave well when the number of players p and universe size n are small. Thus, as in previous work, our main efforts will be aimed at giving

protocols to reduce p and n while approximately preserving the fraction β of bad players and the density μ of the bad set. Roughly speaking, in one round we will reduce p and n to polylog(p) and polylog(n), respectively. For this, we consider protocols that select a subset of the universe (or a subset of the players).

4.1 Definitions

Definition 4.1 *A* $[(p,n) \mapsto n']$-universe reduction protocol *is a p-player protocol whose output is a sequence $(s_1, \ldots, s_{n'})$ of elements of $[n]$. Such a protocol is* $[(\beta,\mu) \overset{\gamma}{\mapsto} \mu']$-resilient *if when at most a β fraction of players are cheating and S is any subset of $[n]$ of density at most μ, the probability that at most a μ' fraction of the output sequence is in S is at least γ. It is* explicit *if the players' strategies are computable in time* $\mathrm{poly}(\log n, p)$*, and given the protocol transcript and $i \in [n']$, the i'th element of the output sequence is computable in time* $\mathrm{poly}(\log n, p)$.

Notice that a (p,n)-selection protocol is equivalent to a $[(p,n) \mapsto n']$-universe reduction protocol with $n' = 1$, and the former is (β,μ,ε)-resilient if and only if the latter is $[(\beta,\mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} 0]$-resilient.

Definition 4.2 *A* $[p \mapsto p']$-player reduction protocol *is a $[(p,p) \mapsto p']$-universe reduction protocol. It is* $[\beta \overset{\gamma}{\mapsto} \beta']$-resilient *if when at most a β fraction of players are cheating, the probability that at most a β' fraction of the output sequence are indices of cheating players is at least γ.*

Definition 4.3 *A* $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$-universe+player reduction protocol *is a p-player protocol whose output is a sequence $(s_1, \ldots, s_{n'})$ of elements of $[n]$ and a sequence $(t_1, \ldots, t_{p'})$ of elements of $[p]$. Such a protocol is* $[(\beta,\mu) \overset{\gamma}{\mapsto} (\beta',\mu')]$-resilient *if when at most a β fraction of players are cheating and S is any subset of $[n]$ of density at most μ, the probability that at most a β' fraction of the first output sequence are cheating players and at most a μ' fraction of the second output sequence is in S is at least γ. It is* explicit *if the players' strategies are computable in time* $\mathrm{poly}(\log n, p)$*, and given the protocol transcript and $i \in [n']$ (resp., $j \in [p']$), the i'th (resp., j'th) element of the first (resp., second) output sequence is computable in time* $\mathrm{poly}(\log n, p)$.

4.2 One-Round Reduction Protocols

In the following one-round protocols, think of $\theta = 1/\mathrm{polylog}(n)$ and $\varepsilon = 1/\mathrm{poly}(n)$.

Theorem 4.4 ([RZ98, Fei99]) *For every $p \in \mathbb{N}$, $\varepsilon > 0$, and $\theta > 0$, there is an explicit, one-round $[p \mapsto p']$-player reduction protocol with*

$$p' = O\left(\frac{1-\beta}{\theta^2} \cdot \log \frac{p}{\varepsilon}\right)$$

that is $[\beta \overset{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} \beta + \theta]$-resilient for all $\beta > 0$. Moreover, the randomness complexity is $p \cdot \log(p/p')$.

Proof: Let $\alpha = 1 - \beta$. The protocol used is the Lightest-Bin protocol of [Fei99]. Each player randomly picks one out of b bins, for b to be determined later. The sequence of players output by the protocol consists of the players who picked the bin chosen by the fewest number of players (ties are broken arbitrarily), and arbitrarily adding players to increase the total number to be $p' = \lfloor p/b \rfloor$.

Fix some bin, and suppose players $\{1, \ldots, \alpha p\}$ are the honest players. For each such player i, define a random variable

$$X_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if player } i \text{ chooses the bin, and} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Let $X = \sum_{i=1}^{\alpha p} X_i$. Since $\mathrm{E}[X_i] = 1/b$, $\mathrm{E}[X] = \alpha p/b$. We will bound the probability that fewer than $(\alpha - \theta) \cdot p/b = (1 - \theta/\alpha) \cdot \mathrm{E}[X]$ of the honest players picked the bin, and then take a union bound over all $b \leq p$ bins. By a Chernoff Bound,

$$\Pr\left[X \leq \left(1 - \frac{\theta}{\alpha}\right) \mathrm{E}[X]\right] \leq \exp\left(\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\theta^2}{\alpha^2} \cdot \frac{\alpha p}{b}\right) \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{p},$$

if we take $b = \lfloor (1/2) \cdot (\theta^2/\alpha) \cdot p/(\log(p/\varepsilon)) \rfloor$. Thus, with probability at least $1 - \varepsilon$, all $b \leq p$ bins have at least $(\alpha - \theta) \cdot p/b \geq (\alpha - \theta) \cdot p'$ honest players, so the output sequence has at least an $\alpha - \theta$ fraction of honest players. We conclude by noting that

$$p' \leq \frac{p}{b} = O\left(\frac{1 - \beta}{\theta^2} \cdot \log \frac{p}{\varepsilon}\right).$$

■

The starting point for our universe reduction protocol is the simple protocol of Lemma 3.1. That protocol has the property that a β fraction of cheating players cannot make any outcome in $[n]$ appear with probability more than $1/n^{1-\beta}$. (This can be seen by taking $\mu = 1/n$.) Thus the output can be viewed as a source with "min-entropy rate" at least $1 - \beta$.[8] To get a higher quality output, it is natural to try applying a *randomness extractor*, a function that extracts almost-uniform bits from sources with sufficient min-entropy. However, randomness extractors require an additional random *seed* to do such extraction. Thus we will enumerate over all seeds of the extractor, and the resulting sequence will be the output of our universe reduction protocol. Fortunately, there exist extractors where the number of seeds is only polylogarithmic in n, the domain of the source.

Actually, it is more convenient for us to work with an object that is essentially equivalent to extractors, namely (averaging) samplers (cf., [BR94, Zuc97, Gol97]). Samplers are functions that output sample points of a given universe, with the property that the fraction of samples from any particular subset of the universe is roughly equal to the density of that subset. In the following definition, U_r denotes an element of $[r]$ chosen uniformly at random.

Definition 4.5 *A function* $\mathrm{Samp} : [r] \to [n]^t$ *is a* (θ, ε) sampler *if for every set* $S \subseteq [n]$,

$$\Pr_{(i_1, \ldots, i_t) \leftarrow \mathrm{Samp}(U_r)} \left[\frac{\#\{j : i_j \in S\}}{t} > \frac{|S|}{n} + \theta\right] \leq \varepsilon.$$

We say that Samp *is* explicit *if for every* $x \in [r]$ *and every* $j \in [t]$*, the* j*'th component of* $\mathrm{Samp}(x)$ *can be computed in time* $\mathrm{poly}(\log r, \log n)$.[9]

[8] The *min-entropy* of a random variable X is defined as $H_\infty(X) = \max_x \Pr[X = x]$. If X takes values in a universe U, then its *min-entropy rate* is defined to be $H_\infty(X)/\log |U|$.

[9] Often the definition of samplers also requires that the fraction of samples that lie in S is also not much larger than the density of S. However, this follows from our definition (paying a factor of 2 in ε) by considering $\overline{S}$. Moreover, we will only need the one-sided version, and below, in Definition 4.11 we will consider a variant which is not symmetric with respect to approximation from above and below.

Zuckerman [Zuc97] showed that samplers (as defined above) are essentially equivalent to randomness extractors. We sketch this connection in Appendix B.

Given $p, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$ and a sampler $\mathrm{Samp} : [r] \to [n]^{n'}$ with $r = \ell^p$, we obtain a $[(p, n) \mapsto n']$-universe reduction protocol Π_{Samp} as follows: the players use the protocol of Lemma 3.1 to select an element $x \in [\ell^p]$, and then output the sequence $\mathrm{Samp}(x)$.

Lemma 4.6 *If* Samp *is a* (θ, ε) *sampler, then for every* $\mu, \beta > 0$, Π_{Samp} *is* $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{\gamma}{\mapsto} \mu+\theta]$*-resilient for* $\gamma = 1 - r^{\beta} \cdot \varepsilon$*. Moreover, the randomness complexity is* $\log r$*.*

Proof: Call $x \in [r]$ "bad" if $\#\{j : i_j \in S\}/t > |S|/n + \theta$ when $(i_1, \ldots, i_t) \leftarrow \mathrm{Samp}(x)$, and note that the number of bad x's is at most $\varepsilon \cdot r$ by the properties of the sampler. The players use the protocol of Lemma 3.1 to select an element x from a universe of size r, where the fraction of bad elements is ε. This is a (p, r)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \varepsilon, r^{\beta} \cdot \varepsilon)$-resilient, and so the probability of selecting a good x is at least $\gamma = 1 - r^{\beta} \cdot \varepsilon$. If a good x is selected, then the fraction of bad elements is increased by at most θ. ■

Notice that for this to be useful, we need the error probability ε of the sampler to be smaller than $r^{-\beta}$, and in fact we will be interested in β that are arbitrarily close to 1. Fortunately, we have samplers that achieve this. (This is equivalent to the fact that we have extractors that work for min-entropy rate arbitrarily close to 0.)

Lemma 4.7 (nonconstructive samplers [RT00, Zuc97]) *For every* $n \in \mathbb{N}, \theta > 0, \varepsilon > 0$ *and* $r \geq n/\varepsilon$*, there exists a* (θ, ε) *sampler* $\mathrm{Samp} : [r] \to [n]^t$ *with* $t = O(\log(1/\varepsilon)/\theta^2)$*.*

It is important to note that the lower bound on r depends linearly on $1/\varepsilon$; this means that we can make the error $\varepsilon \leq r^{-\beta}$ for any $\beta < 1$. Combining the above two lemmas, we have:

Theorem 4.8 (nonconstructive 1-round universe reduction) *For every* $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\beta, \varepsilon, \theta > 0$*, there exists a 1-round* $[(p, n) \mapsto n']$*-universe reduction protocol that is* $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} \mu + \theta]$*-resilient for every* $\mu > 0$*, with*

$$n' = O\left(\frac{\log(1/\varepsilon) + (\beta/(1-\beta)) \cdot (\log n + \log(1/\varepsilon)) + \beta \cdot p}{\theta^2}\right).$$

Moreover, the randomness complexity is $p + (\log n + \log(1/\varepsilon))/(1-\beta) + O(1)$*.*

Proof: First note that without loss of generality, $\theta \geq 1/n$, otherwise we can use the trivial protocol that outputs the entire universe. So now choose $r \in [(cn/(\varepsilon\theta^2))^{1/(1-\beta)}, 2^p \cdot (cn/(\varepsilon\theta^2))^{1/(1-\beta)}]$ such that r is the p'th power of some natural number, and apply Lemma 4.6 with $\varepsilon' = \varepsilon/r^{\beta}$. ■

Thus, for $p = \mathrm{polylog}(n)$, $\theta = 1/\mathrm{polylog}(n)$, $\varepsilon = 1/\mathrm{poly}(n)$, and $\beta = 1 - 1/\mathrm{polylog}(n)$, we can reduce the universe size from n to $\mathrm{polylog}(n)$. If the number of players is constant, then we can iterate this $\log^* n$ times to reduce the universe size to a constant. However, if the number of players p is large, then the above will not reduce the universe size below βp. Therefore, we will combine this with the player reduction of Theorem 4.4, via the following composition lemma.

Lemma 4.9 *Given a* $[(p,n) \mapsto n']$*-universe reduction protocol* Π *and a* $[p \mapsto p']$*-player reduction protocol* Π'*, we can construct a* $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$*-universe+player reduction protocol* Γ *such that if* Π *is* $[(\beta,\mu) \stackrel{\gamma}{\mapsto} \mu']$*-resilient and* Π' *is* $[\beta \stackrel{\gamma'}{\mapsto} \beta']$*-resilient, then* Γ *is* $[(\beta,\mu) \stackrel{\gamma\gamma'}{\mapsto} (\beta',\mu')]$*-resilient. If* Π *and* Π' *are explicit, then so is* Γ*. The number of rounds (resp. randomness complexity) in* Γ *is the maximum of (resp., sum of) the number of rounds (resp., randomness complexities) in* Π *and* Π'*.*

Proof: Γ consists of applications of protocols Π and Π' in parallel, giving the bound on the round complexity. The honest players use independent random coins for both protocols, so the randomness complexity is the sum of the randomness complexities of the respective protocols. The probability that Γ succeeds is the probability that both Π and Π' succeed, and since they are independent this is just $\gamma\gamma'$. Finally, the computation time of Γ is the sum of the computation times of Π and Π', so that if the latter protocols are explicit, then so is the former. ■

This yields:

Corollary 4.10 (nonconstructive 1-round universe+player reduction) *For every* $n,p \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\beta,\theta,\varepsilon > 0$*, there exists a 1-round* $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$*-universe+player reduction protocol that is* $[(\beta,\mu) \stackrel{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} (\beta+\theta,\mu+\theta)]$*-resilient for every* $\mu > 0$*, with*

$$\begin{aligned} n' &= \mathrm{poly}(\log n, \log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta, p) \\ p' &= \mathrm{poly}(\log p, \log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta) \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, the randomness complexity is $[\log n + O(\log(1/\varepsilon) + \log(1/\theta) + p)]/(1-\beta) + p \log p$*.*

Notice that if we want to preserve the density μ of the bad set up to a constant factor, then we can set $\theta = 1/\mu$ and the above protocol will reduce the universe size to n' depending polynomially on $1/\mu$. However, to obtain some of our results (e.g. Theorems 2.9, 2.8, and their explicit versions), it will be beneficial to reduce to a universe size that depends almost-linearly on $1/\mu$. To achieve this, we use a variant of our sampler-based protocol that is tailored to a particular value of μ.

Definition 4.11 *A function* $\mathrm{Samp} : [r] \to [n]^t$ *is a* (μ,θ,ε) density-tailored sampler *if for every set* $S \subseteq [n]$ *with* $|S| \le \mu \cdot n$*,*

$$\Pr_{(i_1,\ldots,i_t) \leftarrow \mathrm{Samp}(U_r)} \left[\frac{\#\{j : i_j \in S\}}{t} > \mu + \theta \right] \le 1 - \varepsilon.$$

We say that Samp *is* explicit *if for every* $x \in [r]$ *and every* $j \in [t]$*, the* j*'th component of* $\mathrm{Samp}(x)$ *can be computed in time* $\mathrm{poly}(\log r, \log n)$*.*

Density-tailored samplers are essentially equivalent to 'slice extractors,' defined in [RT00]. As in Lemma 4.6, these density-tailored samplers also induce selection protocols.

Lemma 4.12 *If* Samp *is a* (μ,θ,ε) *density-tailored sampler, then for every* $\beta > 0$*,* Π_{Samp} *is* $[(\beta,\mu) \stackrel{\gamma}{\mapsto} \mu+\theta]$*-resilient for* $\gamma = 1 - r^{\beta} \cdot \varepsilon$*. Moreover the randomness complexity is* $\log r$*.*

The reason we are interested in these density-tailored samplers is that they exist with slightly better parameters for certain values of μ.

Lemma 4.13 (nonconstructive density-tailored samplers [Vad04]) *There is a universal constant c such that for every $n \in \mathbb{N}, \mu > 0, \theta > 0, \varepsilon > 0$, $t \geq c \cdot \log(1/\varepsilon) \cdot \max\{1/\mu, \mu/\theta^2\}$, and $r \geq c \cdot n \cdot (\mu \log(1/\mu))/(\varepsilon \log(1/\varepsilon))$, there exists a $(\mu, \theta, \varepsilon)$ density-tailored sampler* $\mathrm{Samp} : [r] \to [n]^t$.

Note that the number of samples t in these samplers depends linearly on $1/\mu$ (if $\theta = \Omega(\mu)$) and not polynomially as in Lemma 4.7. Combining the above lemma with Lemma 4.6 we get a nonconstructive 1-round universe reduction protocol with different parameters from those of Theorem 4.8:

Theorem 4.14 (nonconstructive, density-tailored 1-round universe reduction) *There is a universal constant c such that for every $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\beta, \mu, \varepsilon, \theta > 0$ and every*

$$n' \geq c \cdot \max\left\{\frac{\mu}{\theta^2}, \frac{1}{\theta}\right\} \cdot \left(\log\frac{1}{\varepsilon} + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \left(\log n + \log\frac{1}{\beta}\right) + \beta \cdot p\right),$$

there exists a 1-round $[(p, n) \mapsto n']$-universe reduction protocol that is $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} \mu + \theta]$-resilient. Moreover, the randomness complexity is $p + [\log n + \log(1/\varepsilon) - \log\log(1/\varepsilon) - \log(1/\mu) + \log\log(1/\mu) + \log(1/\beta)]/(1-\beta) + O(1)$.

Proof: We can choose $r \in [r', 2^p \cdot r']$ such that r is the p'th power of some natural number and

$$r' = \left(\frac{cn \cdot \mu \log\frac{1}{\mu}}{\beta \cdot \varepsilon \log\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}}.$$

We then apply Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13 with $\varepsilon' = \varepsilon/r^\beta$. ■

4.3 Iteration

Now we iterate our 1-round protocols to reduce both the number of players and the size of the universe to a constant. The iteration method is given by the following lemma.

Lemma 4.15 *Given a $[(p, n) \mapsto (p', n')]$-universe+player reduction protocol Π and a $[(p', n') \mapsto (p'', n'')]$-universe+player reduction protocol Π', we can construct a $[(p, n) \mapsto (p'', n'')]$-universe+player reduction protocol $\Pi \circ \Pi'$ such that if Π is $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{\gamma}{\mapsto} (\beta', \mu')]$-resilient and Π' is $[(\beta', \mu') \overset{\gamma'}{\mapsto} (\beta'', \mu'')]$-resilient, then $\Pi \circ \Pi'$ is $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{\gamma\gamma'}{\mapsto} (\beta'', \mu'')]$-resilient. If Π and Π' are explicit, then so is $\Pi \circ \Pi'$, and the number of rounds (resp., randomness complexity) in $\Pi \circ \Pi'$ is the sum of the number of rounds (resp., randomness complexities) in Π and Π'.*

Proof: We construct the protocol $\Pi \circ \Pi'$ as follows: first the initial p players execute protocol Π on the universe of size n, resulting in a collection of p' players and a universe of size n'. Now the selected p' players run protocol Π' on the selected universe of size n'. The output is a collection of p'' players and a universe of size n''.

Now suppose that at most a β fraction of the players are cheating, and S is a subset of $[n]$ of density at most μ. If Π is $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{\gamma}{\mapsto} (\beta', \mu')]$-resilient then with probability at least γ, the resulting collection of players contains at most a β' fraction of cheating players, and the resulting

universe contains at most a μ' fraction of strings from S. If in addition Π' is $[(\beta',\mu') \stackrel{\gamma'}{\mapsto} (\beta'',\mu'')]$-resilient, then assuming Π was successful (which occurs with probability at least γ), applying Π' on the resulting collections yields the following with probability at least γ': a collection of p'' players of which at most a β'' fraction is cheating, and a universe of size n'' of which at most μ'' belong to S. Thus, with probability at least $\gamma\gamma'$ both protocols are successful, and so $\Pi \circ \Pi'$ is $[(\beta,\mu) \stackrel{\gamma\gamma'}{\mapsto} (\beta'',\mu'')]$-resilient.

The computation time of $\Pi \circ \Pi'$ is the sum of the computation times of Π and Π', and so if the latter two are explicit, then so is the former. Finally, since $\Pi \circ \Pi'$ is the sequential application of Π and Π', both the randomness complexity and the number of rounds are simply the sums of the respective quantities in Π and Π'. ■

Using this composition lemma, we can now construct a many-round protocol that reduces the universe size and the number of players. This protocol will be a main component of our final protocols.

Theorem 4.16 (many-round universe+player reduction) *For every $n,p \in \mathbb{N}$ and every $\beta,\theta,\varepsilon > 0$, there exists a $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$-universe+player reduction protocol that is $[(\beta,\mu) \stackrel{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} (\beta+\theta,\mu+\theta)]$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$, with*

$$\begin{aligned} n' &= \mathrm{poly}(\log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta) \\ p' &= \mathrm{poly}(\log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta). \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, the number of rounds is $t = \max\{\log^* n, \log^* p\} - \log^* n' + O(1)$ and the randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(p + t\cdot\log(1/\varepsilon) + t\cdot\log(1/\theta))]/(1-\beta) + O(p\log p)$.

Proof: We iteratively apply the nonconstructive 1-round universe+player reduction of Corollary 4.10 using the composition of Lemma 4.15. Specifically, we let $p_1 = p$, $n_1 = n$, $\beta_1 = \beta$, $\mu_1 = \mu$ and for $i = 1,\ldots,t$ (for t to be determined below), and we let Π_i be a $[(p_i,n_i) \mapsto (p_{i+1},n_{i+1})]$-universe+player reduction protocol that is $[(\beta_i,\mu) \stackrel{1-\varepsilon_i}{\mapsto} (\beta_i+\theta_i,\mu_i+\theta_i)]$-resilient obtained from Corollary 4.10 for appropriate choices of the parameters. Specifically, Corollary 4.10 allows us to take

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_i &= \varepsilon/\max\{\log n_{i-1}, p_{i-1}\} \\ \theta_i &= \theta/\max\{\log\log n_{i-1}, \log p_{i-1}\} \\ \beta_i &= \beta_{i-1} + \theta_{i-1} \\ \mu_i &= \mu_{i-1} + \theta_{i-1} \\ p_i &= \mathrm{poly}(\log p_{i-1}, \log(1/\varepsilon_i), 1/\theta_i) = \mathrm{poly}(\log p_{i-1}, \log\log n_{i-1}, \log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta) \\ n_i &= \mathrm{poly}(\log n_{i-1}, \log(1/\varepsilon_i), 1/\theta_i, p_{i-1}) = \mathrm{poly}(p_{i-1}, \log n_{i-1}, \log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta). \end{aligned}$$

We compose these protocols to get $\Pi_1 \circ \ldots \circ \Pi_t$, a $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$-universe+player reduction protocol. We can choose t so that $p' = p_t = \mathrm{poly}(\log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta)$, $n' = n_t = \mathrm{poly}(\log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta)$, and $t = \max\{\log^* n, \log^* p\} - \log^* n' + O(1)$. (Specifically, this follows by applying Lemma A.1 to the sequences $a_i = p_i$ and $b_i = n_i$ and function $f(x) = ((\log x)\cdot\log(1/\varepsilon)\cdot 1/\theta)^c$.)

By Lemma 4.15, $\Pi_1 \circ \ldots \circ \Pi_t$ is $[(\beta,\mu) \stackrel{1-\varepsilon'}{\mapsto} (\beta+\theta',\mu+\theta')]$-resilient for all $\beta > 0$, for

$$\theta' = \sum_{i=1}^{t} \theta_i = O(\theta_t) \leq \theta,$$

and similarly $\varepsilon' \leq \varepsilon$.

Note that in round i, the randomness complexity is $(\log n_i + O(\log(1/\varepsilon_i) + \log(1/\theta_i)))/(1-\beta_i) + p_i \log p_i + p_i/(1-\beta_i)$. Thus, the total randomness complexity is $(\log n + o(\log n) + O(t(\log(1/\varepsilon) + \log(1/\theta))))/(1-\beta) + O(p \log p + p/(1-\beta))$. ■

5 Putting It Together

Theorem 5.1 (Thm. 2.6, restated) *For all constants $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $k > 0$ and $\delta > 0$, there exists a constant $\varepsilon < 1$ and a (p,n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\max(\log^* p, \log^* n) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1-\alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\alpha = 1/(k+1) + \delta$ and $\mu = 1/k - \delta$.

(iii) The randomness complexity of the protocol is $(\log n)/\alpha + o(\log n) + O(p \log p)$.

Proof: The claimed protocol is the composition of two protocols. Let $\alpha = 1/(k+1) + \delta$, and $\mu = 1/k - \delta$. Let Π_1 be the protocol of Theorem 4.16, with $\theta = \delta/2$ and $\varepsilon_1 > 0$ an arbitrary constant. Then Π_1 is a $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$-universe+player reduction protocol that is $[(1-\alpha, \mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon_1}{\mapsto} (1-\alpha+\theta, \mu+\theta)]$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$, where p' and n' are constants. Moreover, the number of rounds is $r = \max\{\log^* n, \log^* p\} + O(1)$ and the randomness complexity is $(\log n)/\alpha + o(\log n) + O(p \log p)$.

With probability at least ε_1, the fraction of good players output by Π_1 is at least $\alpha' = 1/(k+1) + \delta/2$, and the fraction of bad elements of the universe is at most $\mu' = 1/k - \delta/2$. Since $\lfloor 1/\alpha' \rfloor \leq \lceil 1/\mu' \rceil - 1$, we now can apply Π_2, the protocol of Lemma 3.2. Π_2 is a (p',n')-selection protocol that is $(1-\alpha', \mu', \varepsilon_2)$-resilient for some constant $\varepsilon_2 < 1$. Note that Π_2 consists of one round, and its randomness complexity is constant.

Combining Π_1 with Π_2, we get a (p,n)-selection protocol that is $(1-\alpha, \mu, (1-\varepsilon_1)\cdot\varepsilon_2)$-resilient. The number of rounds is $\max\{\log^* n, \log^* p\} + O(1)$, and the randomness complexity is $(\log n)/\alpha + o(\log n) + O(p \log p)$. ■

Next we prove Theorems 2.8 and 2.9 that optimize the relationship between the density μ of the bad set and the error probability ε. First, we present a version where we do not reduce the number of players.

Theorem 5.2 (Thm. 2.8, restated) *For all $\mu, \alpha > 0$, $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$ there exists a (p,n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\log^* n - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1-\alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for

$$\varepsilon = \mu^\alpha \cdot O\left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu} + (1-\alpha)p\right)^{1-\alpha} \cdot 2^{(1-\alpha)p}.$$

(iii) The randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(p + \log(1/\mu))]/\alpha + \log(1/(1-\alpha)) + O(p \log p)$.

To prove this theorem, we use the protocol of Lemma 3.1 as the final one-round protocol. In order for this to work well, we need to reduce the size of the universe to $n' \approx 1/\mu$. Lemma 3.1 also requires that the universe size n' is larger than the number of players (indeed, n' must be some natural number to the power of p), which results in the bad dependence of ε on p above. However, when the number p of players and the fraction α of honest players are constant, the bound becomes $\varepsilon = \tilde{O}(\mu^\alpha)$, which nearly matches the lower bound of $\varepsilon \geq \mu^\alpha$ proven in [GGL98] (see Theorem 7.3).

Proof: In the proof we often write $\beta = 1 - \alpha$ to denote the fraction of dishonest players. We can assume without loss of generality that $n \geq 1/\mu$, otherwise we can trivially output an arbitrary element of $[n]$. Our aim will be to reduce the size of the universe to $n_2 \approx 1/\mu$. This is done in two steps:

1. First, we reduce the size of the universe to $n_1 = \text{poly}(1/\mu)$ using the protocol of Theorem 4.16 just as a $[(p, n_1) \mapsto n_2]$-universe reduction protocol (ignoring the player reduction). The parameters of the protocol will be $\varepsilon_1 = \mu$ and $\theta_1 = \mu$, so the protocol is $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon_1}{\mapsto} \mu + \theta_1]$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$, with

$$n_1 \quad = \quad \text{poly}(1/\mu).$$

   The number of rounds of Π_1 is $t = \log^* n - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$, and its randomness complexity is

$$\begin{aligned} &\log n + o(\log n) + O(t \log(1/\mu) + p))/\alpha + O(p \log p) \\ &= \quad \log n + o(\log n) + O(\log(1/\mu) + p))/\alpha + O(p \log p), \end{aligned}$$

   where we use the fact that $t \log(1/\mu) = O(\log(1/\mu)) + o(\log n)$ for $t = \log^* n - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$.

2. Let $\mu_1 = \mu + \theta_1 = 2\mu$. We now reduce the size of the universe from n_1 to n_2 using the protocol of Theorem 4.14: a 1-round $[(p, n_1) \mapsto n_2]$-universe reduction protocol that is $[(\beta, \mu_1) \overset{1-\varepsilon_2}{\mapsto} \mu_1 + \theta_2]$-resilient with $\varepsilon_2 = \mu^\alpha$ and $\theta_2 = \mu_1 = 2\mu$. Theorem 4.14 allows us to choose any $n_2 \geq v$, where

$$\begin{aligned} v \quad &= \quad O\left(\frac{1}{\mu_1} \cdot \left(\log \frac{1}{\varepsilon_2} + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \cdot \left(\log n_1 + \log \frac{1}{\beta}\right) + \beta \cdot p\right)\right) \\ &= \quad O\left(\frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \left(\alpha \log \frac{1}{\mu} + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \cdot \left(\log \frac{1}{\mu} + \log \frac{1}{\beta}\right) + \beta \cdot p\right)\right) \\ &= \quad O\left(\frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu} + \beta p\right)\right). \end{aligned}$$

   We choose $n_2 \in [v, 2^p \cdot v]$ to be the smallest p'th power of an integer greater than or equal to v. The randomness complexity is $[O(\log(1/\mu)) + \log(1/\beta)]/\alpha = O(\log(1/\mu)/\alpha) + \log(1/\beta) + O(1)$, where we use the fact that $\beta = 1 - \alpha$.

Composing the above two protocols as in Lemma 4.15, we are in the following situation: There is a universe of size n_2, out of which a $\mu_2 = \mu + \theta_1 + \theta_2 = O(\mu)$ fraction of the elements are in

the bad set. Now, since we chose n_2 to be an integer to the power of p, we can use the protocol of Lemma 3.1. This is a (p, n_2)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \mu_2, \varepsilon_3)$-resilient. Note that

$$\begin{aligned}
\varepsilon_3 &= n_2^{\beta} \cdot \mu_2 \\
&\leq (v \cdot 2^p)^{\beta} \cdot O(\mu) \\
&= O\left(\frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log\frac{1}{\mu} + \beta p\right) \cdot 2^p\right)^{\beta} \cdot O(\mu) \\
&= O\left(\mu^{\alpha} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log\frac{1}{\mu} + \beta p\right)^{\beta} \cdot 2^{\beta p}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

The randomness complexity of this last sub-protocol is $\log n_2 \leq O(p + \log(1/\alpha) + \log(1/\mu))$.

Putting all three parts together, we get a (p, n)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\varepsilon = \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2 + \varepsilon_3 = O(\varepsilon_3)$. The number of rounds of the protocol is $t = \log^* n - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$, and the randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(p + \log(1/\mu))]/\alpha + \log(1/\beta)O(p \log p)$. ■

Now we eliminate the bad dependence on p by combining the above with a player reduction, at the price of a slightly worse error probability of $\varepsilon = \mu^{\Omega(\alpha)}$.

Theorem 5.3 (Thm. 2.9, restated) *There is a universal constant c such that for all $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mu, \alpha > 0$ satisfying $\alpha \geq \sqrt{c \log\log(1/\mu)/\log(1/\mu)}$, there exists a (p, n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\max\{\log^* p, \log^* n\} - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\varepsilon = \mu^{\Omega(\alpha)}$.

(iii) The randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(p)]/\alpha + O(p \log p) + \mathrm{poly}(1/\alpha, \log(1/\mu))$.

Proof: In what follows, we use α and β interchangeably, with $\alpha = 1 - \beta$. The protocol is essentially the same protocol as in Theorem 2.8, except that we precede it with an appropriate player reduction.

1. For the first stage, we use the protocol of Theorem 4.16, used only as a $[p \mapsto p_1]$-player reduction protocol (ignoring the universe reduction). We use parameters $\varepsilon_1 = \mu$ and $\theta_1 = \alpha/3$, so the protocol is $[\beta \overset{1-\varepsilon_1}{\mapsto} \beta + \theta_1]$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$, with

   $$p_1 = \mathrm{poly}(1/\alpha, \log(1/\mu)).$$

   The number of rounds of Π_1 is $t = \log^* p - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$, and its randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(t \cdot (\log(1/\mu) + \log(1/\alpha)) + p)]/(1 - \beta) + O(p \log p)$.

2. Let $\beta_2 = \beta + \theta_1$, $\alpha_2 = 1 - \beta_2 = 2\alpha/3$. Π_2 is the protocol of Theorem 4.4, a $[p_1 \mapsto p_2]$-player reduction protocol that is $[\beta_2 \overset{1-\varepsilon_2}{\mapsto} \beta_2 + \theta_2]$-resilient with $\varepsilon_2 = \mu^{\alpha/c}$ and $\theta_2 = \alpha/3$ for a constant c to be determined later. The resulting number of players is

   $$\begin{aligned}
   p_2 &= O\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\theta_2^2}\left(\log\frac{1}{\varepsilon_2} + \log p_1\right)\right) \\
   &= O\left(\frac{1}{\alpha}\left(\frac{\alpha}{c}\log\frac{1}{\mu} + \log\frac{1}{\alpha} + \log\log\frac{1}{\mu}\right)\right) \\
   &= \log\frac{1}{\mu} + O\left(\frac{1}{\alpha}\log\frac{1}{\alpha} + \frac{1}{\alpha}\log\log\frac{1}{\mu}\right),
   \end{aligned}$$

for a sufficiently large choice of the constant c. The randomness complexity is $p_1 \log p_1 = \mathrm{poly}(1/\alpha, \log(1/\mu))$.

3. Now we do a universe reduction in the same way as Steps 1 and 2 of the proof of Theorem 2.8, except that we run it using only the p_2 players selected above. Recall that these steps reduce the universe size to n_2, where n_2 is the smallest number that is an integer to the power of p_2 greater than or equal to

$$\begin{aligned} v &= O\left(\frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu} + \beta p_2\right)\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \mathrm{poly}\left(\frac{1}{\alpha}, \log \frac{1}{\mu}\right). \end{aligned}$$

Now we observe that

$$2^{p_2} = \frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu}\right)^{O(1/\alpha)} \geq v,$$

so in fact $n_2 = 2^{p_2}$. This leaves us with a universe of size n_2, out of which a $\mu_2 = \mu + \theta_1 + \theta_2 = O(\mu)$ fraction of the elements are in the bad set.

4. The protocol now concludes in the same way as the proof of Theorem 2.9, using the protocol of Lemma 3.1. This is a (p_2, n_2)-selection protocol that is $(\beta_3, \mu_2, \varepsilon_3)$-resilient, where

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_3 &= n_2^{\beta_3} \cdot \mu_2 \\ &\leq (2^{p_2})^{\beta} \cdot O(\mu) \\ &= \frac{1}{\mu^{\beta_3}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu}\right)^{O(\beta_3/\alpha)} \cdot O(\mu) \\ &= \mu^{1-\beta_3} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu}\right)^{O(1/\alpha)} \\ &= \mu^{\alpha/3} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu}\right)^{O(1/\alpha)}. \end{aligned}$$

The randomness complexity of this sub-protocol is $\log n_2 = p_2$.

Putting everything together, we get a (p, n)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for

$$\varepsilon = \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2 + \varepsilon_3 = \mu^{\Omega(\alpha)} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu}\right)^{O(1/\alpha)} = \mu^{\Omega(\alpha)},$$

when $\alpha \geq \sqrt{c \log\log(1/\mu)/\log(1/\mu)}$ for a large enough constant c.

Finally, in order to save on the round and randomness complexity, note that the player reduction in Step 1 can be done in parallel with the universe reduction in Step 3. So this yields a protocol with $t = \max\{\log^* p, \log^* n\} - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$ rounds, where the randomness complexity is $[\log n + o(\log n) + O(p)]/\alpha + O(p \log p) + \mathrm{poly}(1/\alpha, \log(1/\mu))$.

■

6 Explicit Protocols

We now give explicit versions of the above results. The first is the explicit version of Theorem 2.6.

Theorem 6.1 *For all constants $k \in \mathbb{N}^+$, $\gamma > 0$, and $\delta > 0$, there exists a constant $\varepsilon < 1$ such that for every $n, p \in \mathbb{N}$, there is an explicit (p, n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\max(\log^* p, \log^* n) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\alpha = 1/(k+1) + \delta$ and $\mu = 1/k - \delta$.

(iii) The randomness complexity of the protocol is $(\log n)^{1+\gamma} + O(p \log p)$.

Apart from its explicitness, note that the randomness complexity of the above theorem is now $(\log n)^{1+\gamma}$ for an arbitrarily small constant γ, rather than $(1 + o(1))(\log n)/\alpha$. Intuitively, this occurs because the explicit sampler we use (based on an extractor of [RRV99]) only has randomness complexity polynomially close to optimal. It is possible to remedy this and obtain a randomness complexity of $(1 + o(1)) \log n$ by using other samplers (e.g. based on the extractors of [RRV02]) for the first few rounds of universe reduction, but this creates some messy constraints on the other parameters, so we omit a formal statement.

We also give explicit versions of Theorem 2.8 and Theorem 2.9.

Theorem 6.2 *For every constant $\gamma > 0$, and every $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mu, \alpha > 0$, there exists a (p, n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\log^* n - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for

$$\varepsilon = \mu^{\alpha} \cdot O\left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu} + (1 - \alpha)\, p\right)^{1-\alpha} \cdot 2^{(1-\alpha)p}.$$

(iii) The randomness complexity is $[(\log n)^{1+\gamma} + O(p + \log(1/\mu))]/\alpha + O(\log(1/(1-\alpha))) + O(p \log p)$.

(iv) The protocol is explicit given appropriate samplers of size

$$s = \mathrm{poly}(2^p, 1/\mu, \log^{(3)} n)^{1/(\alpha)}.$$

which can be obtained probabilistically in time $O(s)$ and deterministically in time $2^{O(s)}$.

Theorem 6.3 *There is a universal constant c such that for every constant $\gamma > 0$ and every $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mu, \alpha > 0$ satisfying $\alpha \geq \sqrt{c \log\log(1/\mu)/\log(1/\mu)}$, there exists a (p, n)-selection protocol with the following properties:*

(i) The protocol has $\max\{\log^* p, \log^* n\} - \log^*(1/\mu) + O(1)$ rounds.

(ii) The protocol is $(1 - \alpha, \mu, \mu^{\Omega(\alpha)})$-resilient.

(iii) The randomness complexity is $[(\log n)^{1+\gamma} + O(p)]/\alpha + O(p \log p) + \mathrm{poly}(1/\alpha, \log(1/\mu))$.

(iv) The protocol is explicit given appropriate samplers of size

$$s = \mathrm{poly}(1/\mu, 1/\alpha, \log^{(3)} n)^{1/\alpha}.$$

which can be obtained probabilistically in time $O(s)$ and deterministically in time $2^{O(s)}$.

Note that the protocols are explicit whenever $s = O(\log \log n)$ (in particular, when μ and α are constants).

6.1 Explicit Reduction Protocols

In order to prove the above theorems, we wish to make the many-round universe+player reduction protocol given in Theorem 4.16 explicit. Note that the player reductions (relying only on Lemma 3.2) are already constructive, and the problem is that the nonconstructive samplers (Lemma 4.7) used in the universe reduction of Theorem 4.8. After a few rounds of the universe reduction, however, we can already use the nonconstructive samplers: because the universe is small (i.e., $\log^{(3)} n$), we can exhaustively search all possible nonconstructive samplers until we find the optimal one (in time $\mathrm{polylog}(n)$).

For the first few rounds of the universe reduction, however, we need to use constructive samplers. The explicit construction we will use is the sampler-equivalent of an extractor construction of Raz, Reingold and Vadhan [RRV99] (where the equivalence of extractors and samplers is given by [Zuc97]; see Appendix B).

Lemma 6.4 (constructive samplers ([RRV99])) *For every constant $1 > \delta > 0$ and every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\varepsilon, \theta \geq 1/n$, and $r \geq 2^{(\log n)^{1+\delta}}/\varepsilon$, there exists a (θ, ε) sampler* $\mathrm{Samp} : [r] \to [n]^t$ *with*

$$t = \mathrm{poly}\left(\frac{1}{\theta}, \log n\right).$$

As before, this sampler yields a 1-round universe reduction protocol. If we use this sampler in Lemma 4.6, and fix some parameters, we get the following constructive protocol.

Theorem 6.5 (constructive 1-round universe reduction) *For every constant $1 > \delta > 0$, and every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $p \leq \log n$, $\varepsilon, \theta \geq 1/n$, $\beta \geq 1/p$, there exists an explicit 1-round $[(p, n) \mapsto n']$-universe reduction protocol that is $[(\beta, \mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} \mu + \theta]$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$, with*

$$n' = \mathrm{poly}\left(\log n, \frac{1}{\theta}\right).$$

Moreover, the randomness complexity is $(\log n)^{1+\delta}/(1-\beta) + p$.

We now wish to iterate this constructive 1-round universe-reduction protocol, along with an appropriate player-reduction protocol, in order to obtain a constructive analogue of Theorem 4.16. However, in order to keep the expressions simple, we give two different constructive variants of Theorem 4.16 with parameters tailored to our needs. The first will be used in the protocol of Theorem 6.1, and the second will be used in the protocols of Theorems 6.2 and 6.3.

Theorem 6.6 (constructive many-round universe+player reduction for constant parameters) *For all constants $\beta, \varepsilon, \theta, \delta > 0$, there exist constants $p', n' \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for every $p, n \in \mathbb{N}$, there is an explicit $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$-universe+player reduction protocol that is $[(\beta,\mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} (\beta+\theta, \mu+\theta)]$-resilient for every $\mu > 0$. Moreover, the number of rounds is $t = \max\{\log^* n, \log^* p\} - \log^* n' + O(1)$ and the randomness complexity is $(\log n)^{1+\delta} + O(p \log p)$.*

Proof: The protocol proceeds in stages. First, we iteratively apply the player reduction protocol of Theorem 4.4 to reduce the number of players to a constant $p' = \mathrm{poly}(\log(1/\varepsilon), 1/\theta) = O(1)$, so that the fraction of bad players increases from β to at most $\beta + \theta/2$, except with probability $\varepsilon/4$. The iteration is done as in Theorem 4.16, except that we disregard the universe reduction.

Second, we reduce the size of the universe to

$$n' = \mathrm{poly}\left(\frac{1}{\theta}, \log^{(3)} n\right) = \mathrm{poly}\left(\log^{(3)} n\right),$$

so that with probability at least $1 - \varepsilon/4$, the density of the bad set increases by at most $\theta/2$.s This is done by iteratively applying the protocol of Theorem 6.5 three times, each time with errors $\varepsilon/12$ and $\theta/6$. Since μ, θ, ε, and β are all constants, the bound on n' follows.

Note that we are now in the following situation, with probability at least $1 - \varepsilon/2$: there are a constant p' players, out of which at most a $\beta' = \beta + \theta/2$ fraction are adversarial. The universe is of size n', and the fractional size of the bad set is at most $\mu' = \mu + \theta/2$.

We now continue as in the proof of Theorem 4.16, with error parameters $\varepsilon' = \varepsilon/2$ and $\theta' = \theta/2$. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 4.16, we used nonconstructive samplers. For this protocol, we use exhaustive search to find these optimal samplers of the appropriate size. We need samplers of size at most

$$s = 2^{p'} \cdot \mathrm{poly}(n', 1/\theta, 1/\varepsilon)^{1/(1-\beta)} = \mathrm{poly}(\log^{(3)} n),$$

which can be obtained in time $2^{O(s)} = o(\log n)$. Thus, the protocol is explicit. In order to get the desired round complexity, note that we can do the player reduction and the universe reduction in parallel, as in Theorem 4.16. ■

The following theorem will be used in the protocols of Theorems 6.2 and 6.3. We note that the range of parameters for which we prove this theorem and some of the constraints obtained are not optimal, as our emphases here are clarity and readability.

Theorem 6.7 (constructive many-round universe+player reduction for μ parameters) *For every constant $\delta > 0$, and every $n, p \in \mathbb{N}$, $\varepsilon = \theta = \mu > 0$, $0 < \beta < 1 - \mu$, there exists a $[(p,n) \mapsto (p',n')]$-universe+player reduction protocol that is $[(\beta,\mu) \overset{1-\varepsilon}{\mapsto} (\beta+\theta, \mu+\theta)]$-resilient with*

$$\begin{aligned} n' &= \mathrm{poly}(1/\mu) \\ p' &= \mathrm{poly}(1/\mu). \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, the number of rounds is $t = \max\{\log^* n, \log^* p\} - \log^* n' + O(1)$ and the randomness complexity is $[(\log n)^{1+\delta} + O(p + t \cdot \log(1/\varepsilon) + t \cdot \log(1/\theta))]/(1-\beta) + O(p \log p)$. Finally, the protocol is explicit given appropriate samplers of size

$$s = \mathrm{poly}(2^{\min\{p, \mathrm{poly}(1/\mu)\}}, 1/\mu, \log^{(3)} n)^{1/(1-\beta)}.$$

These samplers can be obtained probabilistically in time $O(s)$ and deterministically in time $2^{O(s)}$.

Proof: The protocol proceeds as in Theorem 6.6. First, we reduce the number of players to $p' = \min\{p, \text{poly}(1/\mu)\}$ so that the fraction of bad players increases from β to at most $\beta' = \beta + \mu/2$, except with probability $\mu/4$, by iteratively applying the player reduction protocol of Theorem 4.4. We then reduce the size of the universe to

$$n' = \max\{2^{p'}, \text{poly}(1/\mu, \log^{(3)} n)\},$$

so that the density of the bad set increases by at most $\mu/2$.

Again, this is done by iteratively applying the one-round universe+player reduction three times, as in the proof of Theorem 4.16. Instead of using the protocol of Theorem 4.8, we use the protocol of Theorem 6.5. At each one of the three iterations, we first check that the constraints on the number of players (p'), the density of the bad set ($\text{O}(\mu)$), and the current size of the universe are satisfied. If this is not the case (and we can not apply the universe reduction), then the universe size is already of size at most n' so we can stop.

As in the previous proof, we are now in the following situation, with probability at least $1 - \mu/2$: there are p' players, out of which at most a $\beta' = \beta + \mu/2$ fraction are adversarial. The universe is of size n', and the density of the bad set is at most $\mu' = 3\mu/2$. Note that

We now continue as in the proof of Theorem 4.16, with error parameters $\varepsilon/2$ and $\theta/2$. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 4.16, we used nonconstructive samplers. For this protocol, we use exhaustive search to find optimal samplers of the appropriate size. We need samplers of size

$$\begin{aligned} s &= 2^{p'} \cdot \text{poly}(n', 1/\varepsilon, 1/\theta)^{1/(1-\beta')} \\ &= \text{poly}(2^{p'}, 1/\mu)^{1/(1-\beta)} \\ &= \text{poly}(2^{\min\{p, \text{poly}(1/\mu)\}}, 1/\mu, \log^{(3)} n)^{1/(1-\beta)} \end{aligned}$$

which can be obtained probabilistically in time $O(s)$ and deterministically in time $2^{O(s)}$. ■

6.2 Putting It Together

The proof of Theorem 6.1 follows exactly the same proof as that of Theorem 2.6, except that it uses the protocol of Theorem 6.6 rather than that of Theorem 4.16.

For Theorems 2.8 and 2.9, we also need a density-tailored sampler that attains parameters as in Lemma 4.13. Since we do not know explicit constructions that do this, we also obtain the density-tailored sampler by exhaustive search.

We now prove Theorem 6.2.

Proof: This is the same proof as that of Theorem 2.8, with two differences. Instead of using the protocol of Theorem 4.16 in step 1, use the protocol of Theorem 6.7. (Note that we may assume that $\alpha \geq \mu$, as required by Theorem 6.7, because otherwise our desired bound on ε is greater than 1.) Second, in step 2, exhaustively search over all possible density-tailored samplers of size $2^p \cdot \text{poly}(1/\mu)^{1/(1-\beta)}$ to find the optimal. The sampler size listed in the statement of Theorem 6.2 is greater than both this bound and the sampler size required for Theorem 6.7. ■

The proof of Theorem 6.3 is the same as that of Theorem 2.9, with the same differences as in the proof of Theorem 6.2. We need samplers of size at most

$$s = \text{poly}(2^{p_2}, 1/\mu, \log^{(3)} n)^{1/\alpha},$$

where p_2 is the number of players after the player reduction done at the start of the proof of Theorem 2.9, so we have

$$2^{p_2} = \frac{1}{\mu} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\mu} \right)^{O(1/\alpha)},$$

and thus

$$s = \mathrm{poly}(1/\mu, 1/\alpha, \log^{(3)} n)^{1/\alpha}.$$

7 Lower Bounds

In this section we state known lower bounds for different parameters of random selection, and how they relate to our protocols.

7.1 Round Complexity

Theorem 7.1 ([SV05]) *For any $(2,n)$-selection protocol that is $(1/2, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for constants $\mu > 0$ and $\varepsilon < 1$, the round complexity is at least $(\log^* n - \log^* \log^* n - O(1))/2$.*

A corollary of this theorem for the case of many parties is the following:

Corollary 7.2 *For any (p,n)-selection protocol that is $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient with $\beta \geq 1/2$ and for constants $\mu > 0$ and $\varepsilon < 1$, the round complexity is at least $(\log^* n - \log^* \log^* n - O(1))/2$.*

Proof: This is a simple reduction from Theorem 7.1. Given any (p,n)-selection protocol Π that is $(\beta, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient with $\beta \geq 1/2$, construct a $(1/2, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient $(2,n)$-selection protocol by having each of the two players simulate $p/2$ players in the protocol Π. ■

The round complexity of our protocols is $\max\{\log^* n, \log^* p\} + O(1)$. For $p \leq n$, this is optimal up to a factor of 2 (for the case $\beta \geq 1/2$), by the above corollary. It is not known whether $\log^* p$ rounds are necessary. Indeed, for $\beta < 1/2$, ruling out even 1-round protocols for collective coin-flipping (i.e., random selection when $n = 2$) or leader election is a long-standing open problem. (It is known that $\log^* p$ rounds are necessary in case the players send only one bit per round [RSZ02].)

7.2 Error Probability

Theorem 7.3 ([GGL98]) *For any (p,n)-selection protocol that is $(1-\alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient, $\varepsilon \geq \mu^{\alpha}$.*

Our Theorem 2.8 achieves a nearly matching bound of $\varepsilon = \tilde{O}(\mu^{\alpha})$ in case the number of players is constant, $\alpha = \Omega(1)$ and $\mu = o(1)$. For a nonconstant number of players, Theorem 2.9 achieves $\varepsilon = \mu^{\Omega(\alpha)}$, which is tight up to a constant factor in the exponent.

7.3 μ versus α

Theorem 7.4 ([Fei99], Thm. 4) *Suppose that $\alpha, \mu > 0$ satisfy $\lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor > \lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$. Then in any (p,n)-selection protocol, there exists a set $H \subseteq [p]$ of at least αp players and a set $T \subseteq [n]$ of density at least $1 - \mu$ such that no matter what deterministic strategies the players in H play, the players in $[p] \setminus H$ have a strategy to force the outcome to land outside of T.*

Proof: Suppose that $\lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor > \lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$. Assume towards a contradiction that there is some (p,n)-selection protocol Π such that for all $H \subseteq [p]$ of at least αp players and for all $T \subseteq [n]$ of density at least $1-\mu$, the players in H have a deterministic strategy to force the outcome into T.

Since the subsets H have density at least αp, there exist $h = \lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor$ such subsets that are mutually disjoint. Call them $H_1, \ldots, H_h$. Since the sets T have density at least $1-\mu$, there exist $t = \lceil 1/\mu \rceil$ such subsets that have no common intersection, say $T_1, \ldots, T_t$.

Π guarantees that for every $i \in \{1, \ldots, t\}$, there exists a strategy for the players in H_i to force the output into T_i. This is impossible, however, since there are no elements in the intersection of the T_i's. ■

We use this to deduce that the tradeoff achieved in our Theorem 2.6 between the fraction α of honest players and the density μ of the bad set is nearly optimal.

Corollary 7.5 *For any (p,n)-selection protocol that is $(1-\alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient with $\varepsilon < 1$, $\lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor \leq \lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$.*

Proof: Let Π be a (p,n)-selection protocol that is $(1-\alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient with $\varepsilon < 1$. Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that $\lfloor 1/\alpha \rfloor > \lceil 1/\mu \rceil - 1$, and let H and T be the set of players and bad set guaranteed by Theorem 7.4. Now we view Π as inducing a game between two players A and B, where A controls the players in H and B controls the players in $[p] \setminus H$, and A wins if the outcome is in T and B wins if the outcome is in $[n] \setminus T$. A basic result in game theory [NM44] says that in every finite, full-information two-player game such as this, one of the players has a winning strategy, i.e., a strategy that wins regardless of how the other player plays. Theorem 7.4 says that A does not have a winning strategy in this game. Thus, B must have a winning strategy. That is, if the players outside H cheat, they can force the outcome to land in $\overline{T}$, regardless of how the players in H play (in particular, if they play honestly). Since there are at most $(1-\alpha)p$ players outside H, and $\overline{T}$ has density at most μ, this contradicts the fact that Π is $(1-\alpha, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient with $\varepsilon < 1$. ■

7.4 Randomness and Communication Complexity

Theorem 7.6 *For any (p,n)-selection protocol that is $(1-\alpha', \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\varepsilon < 1$, the randomness and communication complexities are at least*

$$\max\left\{(1-\alpha')p, \frac{1-\varepsilon}{\alpha}\log\frac{\mu n}{\varepsilon}\right\},$$

where $\alpha = \lfloor \alpha' p \rfloor / p$.

To prove this theorem, we will use need a few basic notions from information theory. (See [CT91] for more details.) The *entropy* of a discrete random variable X is defined as $H(X) = \mathrm{E}_{x \leftarrow X}[\log(1/\Pr[X=x])]$. The entropy of X can be no larger than $\log|supp(X)|$. In addition, for any deterministic function f, $H(f(X)) \leq H(X)$. For two jointly distributed random variables (X,Y), the *conditional entropy* of X given Y is $H(X|Y) = \mathrm{E}_{y \leftarrow Y}[H(X|Y=y)]$. The "chain rule" for entropy says that $H(X,Y) = H(Y) + H(X|Y)$.
We now prove Theorem 7.6.

Proof: We will prove that the random variable M denoting all of the messages sent when the honest parties play must have entropy at least $(1-\varepsilon)/(\alpha)\log(\mu n/\varepsilon)$. Then the communication and randomness complexities must be at least as large, because the messages are a deterministic function of each of these.

Let $(M_1, \ldots, M_r)$ denote the individual messages sent in the protocol. Without loss of generality, we assume that in each round i, only one player, say number $p(i)$, sends a message. By the chain rule for entropy, we have $H(M) = H(M_1) + H(M_2|M_1) + \cdots + H(M_r|M_1, \ldots, M_{r-1})$.

We will describe an adversary strategy that reduces the entropy of the communication by a factor of α. The adversary is obtained by the probabilistic method. First we choose a random subset Q of $(1-\alpha)p$ players to corrupt. Then the adversary A will compute its messages as follows. For each round i such that $p(i) \in Q$ and each history $(m_1, \ldots, m_{i-1})$, we select $A(m_1, \ldots, m_{i-1})$ according to the distribution $M_i|_{M_1=m_1,\ldots,M_{i-1}=m_{i-1}}$. This is done independently for each history. Note that here we are describing the process of selecting the adversary's next-message function A. Once this function is selected, the adversary is deterministic.

Observe that for every fixed corruption set Q, if we choose A according to the above distribution and run the protocol with A playing against the honest players, the messages sent are distributed identically according to the honest-distribution M. Thus, we can consider the joint distribution $(Q, A, M_1, \ldots, M_r)$. Now, observe that:

$$\begin{aligned} H(M|Q,A) &= \sum_{i=1}^{r} H(M_i|M_1,\ldots,M_{i-1},Q,A) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{r} \mathop{\mathrm{E}}_{q \leftarrow Q}[H(M_i|M_1,\ldots,M_{i-1},A,Q=q)] \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{r} \alpha \cdot H(M_i|M_1,\ldots,M_{i-1}) \\ &\leq \alpha \cdot H(M). \end{aligned}$$

The second-to-last inequality follows because $H(M_i|M_1, \ldots, M_{i-1}, A, Q = q)$ equals 0 if $i \in Q$ because the adversary is deterministic, and equals $H(M_i|M_1, \ldots, M_{i-1})$ otherwise, because M_i is played by an honest player and the history $(M_1, \ldots, M_{i-1})$ has the same distribution as if all players were honest (even when we condition on $Q = q$).

By averaging, we can fix $Q = q$ and $A = a$ such that $H(M|Q = q, A = a) \leq \alpha \cdot H(M)$. With this adversary, the total amount of entropy going into the protocol is at most $\alpha H(M)$. How much entropy is output by the protocol? Recall that we assumed that Π is a (p, n)-selection protocol that is $(1-\alpha', \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\varepsilon < 1$, and let X be the output distribution of Π. We need the following claim:

Claim 7.7

$$H(X) \geq (1-\varepsilon)\log\frac{\mu n}{\varepsilon}.$$

Proof: Let $S \subset [n]$, $|S| = \mu n$ have maximal weight over all sets of size μn. Note that the resilience of Π guarantees that $\Pr[X \in S] \leq \varepsilon$. Then for all $x \notin S$, $\Pr[X = x] \leq \varepsilon/(\mu n)$. This is due to the fact that there exists some $y \in S$ such that $\Pr[X = y] \leq \varepsilon/(\mu n)$ (since the total probability is ε, and there are μn elements). Thus, if there were some $x \notin S$ such that $\Pr[X = x] > \varepsilon/(\mu n)$, we

could define $S' = S \cup \{x\} \setminus \{y\}$. But $|S'| = \mu n$ and $\Pr[X \in S'] > \Pr[X \in S]$, contradicting the maximality of S. Thus, for all $x \notin S$, $\Pr[X = x] \leq \varepsilon/(\mu n)$.

We can now compute the entropy of X.

$$\begin{aligned} H(X) &= -\sum_{x \in supp(X)} \Pr[X = x] \log \Pr[X = x] \\ &\geq -\sum_{x \notin S} \Pr[X = x] \log \Pr[X = x] \\ &\geq \log \frac{\mu n}{\varepsilon} \sum_{x \notin S} \Pr[X = x] \\ &\geq (1 - \varepsilon) \log \frac{\mu n}{\varepsilon}. \end{aligned}$$

■

It must be the case that $H(M) \geq H(X)$, and so

$$H(M) \geq \frac{1 - \varepsilon}{\alpha} \log \frac{\mu n}{\varepsilon}.$$

Now we show that a randomness complexity of $(1 - \alpha')p$ is necessary. Again suppose this is not the case, and there exists some protocol Π that is $(1 - \alpha', \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\varepsilon < 1$, but with randomness complexity $r < (1 - \alpha)p$. Consider some run of the protocol Π, and suppose that each random choice C_j was set to c_j. Since there are at most r C_j's, the number of players that actually made a choice in the run of the protocol is at most r. Now consider the adversary that corrupts these r players, and sets their random choices to c_j. Running the protocol with this adversary yields a fixed output, since there are no random choices made. Clearly, such a protocol can not be $(r/p, \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient for $\varepsilon < 1$, but the resilience guarantees that it is $(1 - \alpha', \mu, \varepsilon)$-resilient. Thus, $r \geq (1 - \alpha')p$. A similar argument works for the communication complexity. ■

The randomness complexity of the protocol given in Theorem 2.6 is $(\log n/\alpha) + o(\log n) + O(p \log p)$. In terms of the dependence on n, this is optimal up to lower-order terms. The dependence on p is within a logarithmic factor. It would be interesting to improve the randomness complexity to p, or to show that $p \log p$ is necessary.

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A Miscellaneous

Lemma A.1 *Suppose $a_1, a_2, \ldots$ and $b_1, b_2, \ldots$ are sequences of real numbers and f is a monotone non-increasing function such that $a_i \leq \max\{f(a_{i-1}), f(f(b_{i-1}))\}$ and $b_i \leq \max\{a_{i-1}, f(b_{i-1})\}$ for all i. Then $a_t, b_{t+1} \leq \max\{f^{(t-1)}(a_1), f^{(t-1)}(b_1)\}$ for all $t \geq 2$.*

Proof: The lemma is proved by induction on t. For the case $t = 2$, we are given that

$$a_2 \leq \max\{f(a_1), f(f(b_1))\} \leq \max\{f(a_1), f(b_1)\}$$

by the monotonicity of f. Also,

$$b_3 \leq \max\{a_2, f(b_2)\} \leq \max\{\max\{f(a_1), f(b_1)\}, f(a_1), f(f(b_1))\} \leq \max\{f(a_1), f(b_1)\}.$$

Now assume the lemma holds for all $2 \leq i \leq t-1$. We will prove the lemma for $i = t$.

$$\begin{aligned} a_t &\leq \max\{f(a_{t-1}), f(f(b_{t-1}))\} \\ &\leq \max\{f(f^{(t-2)}(a_1)), f(f^{(t-2)}(b_1)), f(f(f^{(t-3)}(a_1))), f(f(f^{(t-3)}(b_1)))\} \\ &= \max\{f^{(t-1)}(a_1), f^{(t-1)}(b_1)\}. \end{aligned}$$

In addition,

$$\begin{aligned} b_t + 1 &\leq \max\{a_t, f(b_t)\} \\ &\leq \max\{f^{(t-1)}(a_1), f^{(t-1)}(b_1), f(f^{(t-2)}(a_1)), f(f^{(t-1)}(b_1))\} \\ &= \max\{f^{(t-1)}(a_1), f^{(t-1)}(b_1)\} \end{aligned}$$

as claimed. ■

B Connection Between Extractors and Samplers

In this section we sketch the connection between extractors and samplers, as shown by Zuckerman [Zuc97]. First, we need a couple of definitions.

Definition B.1 (statistical difference) *For two distributions X and Y over some finite domain, denote the* statistical difference *between them by $\Delta(X, Y)$, where:*

$$\Delta(X, Y) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in supp(X \cup Y)} |\Pr[X = i] - \Pr[Y = i]|.$$

X and Y are ε-close *if $\Delta(X, Y) \leq \varepsilon$.*

We also need a measure of the randomness of a distribution.

Definition B.2 (min-entropy) *The* min-entropy *of a distribution X, denoted by $H_\infty(X)$, is defined as*

$$H_\infty(X) = \min_{i \in supp(X)} \log \frac{1}{\Pr[X = i]}.$$

Definition B.3 (extractor) $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^\ell \times \{0,1\}^d \mapsto \{0,1\}^m$ *is a (k, ε)-extractor if, for any distribution X with $H_\infty(X) \geq k$, when choosing x according to X and r uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^d$, the distribution of* $\text{Ext}(x, r)$ *is ε-close to uniform.*

The connection between extractors and samplers is given by two lemmas:

Lemma B.4 *Let* $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^\ell \times \{0,1\}^d \mapsto \{0,1\}^m$ *be a (k, ε)-extractor. Then* Ext *is also a $(2^{k-\ell}\varepsilon)$-sampler* $\text{Samp} : [R] \to [N]^T$ *for $R = 2^\ell$, $N = 2^m$, and $T = 2^d$.*

Proof: Suppose we are given a (k, ε)-extractor $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^\ell \times \{0,1\}^d \mapsto \{0,1\}^m$. We can view this as a sampler $\text{Samp} : [R] \to [N]^T$ for $R = 2^\ell$, $N = 2^m$, and $T = 2^d$ as follows: on input $x \in [R]$, $\text{Samp}(x) = \{s | s = \text{Ext}(x, i), i \in \{0,1\}^d\}$.

Now suppose that Samp is not an $(\varepsilon, 2^{k-\ell})$-sampler. This means that there exists some $S \subseteq [N]$ such that

$$\Pr_{(i_1, \ldots, i_t) \leftarrow \text{Samp}(U_R)} \left[\frac{\#\{j : i_j \in S\}}{T} > \frac{|S|}{N} + \varepsilon \right] > \frac{2^k}{2^\ell}.$$

Thus, there exists some set of 2^k x's for which

$$\frac{\#\{s | s = \text{Ext}(x, i), i \in \{0,1\}^d\}}{T} > \frac{|S|}{N} + \varepsilon.$$

Denote by X the uniform distribution over these x's, and note that $H_\infty(X) = k$. However, we claim that $\mathrm{Ext}(X, U_{\{0,1\}^d})$ can not be ε-close to uniform. Consider the following statistical test: $f(y) = 1$ if $y \in S$, and $f(y) = 0$ otherwise. Then

$$\left| \Pr\left[f(U_{\{0,1\}^m}) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathrm{Ext}(X, U_{\{0,1\}^d})\right] = 1 \right| > \varepsilon,$$

contradicting the assumption that Ext is a (k, ε)-extractor. ■

Lemma B.5 *Let* $\mathrm{Samp} : [R] \to [N]^T$ *be a* $(\varepsilon, 2^{k-\ell})$*-sampler, with* R*,* N*, and* T *as above. Then* Samp *is also a* $(k + \log(1/\varepsilon), 2\varepsilon)$*-extractor* $\mathrm{Ext} : \{0,1\}^\ell \times \{0,1\}^d \mapsto \{0,1\}^m$*.*

Proof: Given a statistical test $T \subseteq \{0,1\}^m$, let

$$B_T \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ x \in \{0,1\}^\ell : \left| \Pr_{U_{\{0,1\}^d}} [\mathrm{Ext}(x, U_{\{0,1\}^d}) \in T] - \frac{|T|}{n} \right| > \varepsilon \right\}.$$

Since Samp is a $(2^k/2^\ell, \varepsilon)$-sampler we know that $\Pr_{U_R}[U_R \in B_T] \leq 2^{k-\ell}$, so $|B_T| \leq 2^k$.

Let X be a $(k + \log(1/\varepsilon))$ source. We have:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pr_X [X \in B_T] \leq 2^{-(k+\log(1/\varepsilon))} \cdot |B_T| \leq \varepsilon \\
&\Rightarrow \quad \Pr_{X, U_{\{0,1\}^d}} \left[\mathrm{Ext}(X, U_{\{0,1\}^d}) \in T\right] \leq \Pr_X [X \in B_T] \cdot 1 + \Pr_X [X \notin B_T] \cdot \left(\frac{|T|}{N} + \varepsilon \right) \leq \frac{|T|}{N} + 2\varepsilon \\
&\Rightarrow \quad \Pr_{X, U_{\{0,1\}^d}} \left[\mathrm{Ext}\left(X, U_{\{0,1\}^d}\right) \in T\right] - \frac{|T|}{N} \leq 2\varepsilon.
\end{aligned}$$

Since T was an arbitrary statistical test, we can also apply the above inequality to $\overline{T}$ to get $|\Pr_{X, U_{\{0,1\}^d}}[\mathrm{Ext}(X, U_{\{0,1\}^d}) \in T] - |T|/N| \leq 2\varepsilon$. Since T was an arbitrary subset of $\{0,1\}^m$, we have that Ext is a $(k + \log(1/\varepsilon), 2\varepsilon)$-extractor. ■